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Volume 1955 February, 1955 Number 1
THE STATE, COMMUNISM, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW*
GRAY L DORSEYt
"It [the world struggle now taking place] is not a
struggle merely of economic theories, or of forms of
government, or of military power. The issue is the true
nature of man."
"It is, therefore, a struggle which goes to the roots of
the human spirit, and its shadow falls across the long
sweep of man's destiny."
-President Dwight D. Eisenhower, State of the
Union Mes8age (1955).
THE THESIS
A Communist-controlled society is not a State under International
Law. Lest the reader reject this statement without reading further,
on the grounds that should it be accepted it would wreck the United
Nations and lend support to preventive war, let me say immediately
that I do not believe these are necessary or proper inferences. I will
deal with what I think are proper inferences after I have established
the statement as fact by marshalling the evidence in support of it.
However, even should a fact carry only foreboding, it must be faced.
National survival, as individual sanity, demands that we plot our
actions on a mental map that shows.us the world as it is, not as we
would prefer it to be.
THE PROOF
PART I: REASON WHY THESIS HAS NOT BEEN GENERALLY
ACCEPTED HERETOFORE
A. OuR EXCLUSIVELY EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES
Even before I present the evidence in support of the initial state-
ment, however, perhaps I should answer a question that immediately
presents itself: "If a Communist-controlled society is not a State
under International Law, why hasn't this fact been generally recog-
nized?" One reason is a critical deficiency in our modern social sci-
ences. They are empirical only. Empirical social disciplines can record
*Some of the basic research underlying this article was made possible by
Fellowship from the American Council of Learned Societies during 1948-50.
t Assistant Professor of Law, Washington University.
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
the presence or absence of that cooperation that is the difference be-
tween society and chaos. But being able to distinguish between life
and death does not make a physician. Our social sciences by their
basic premises and method--as I will show-can not explore the
question of jvhy men cooperate or do not cooperate. Yet this is exactly
what we must know to deal intelligently with Communism, because
Communism, being revolutionary, destroys cooperation and creates it
in a new mode. The roots of the exclusive empiricism of our social
sciences go deep into the seedbed of modern science and philosophy. It
is necessary to trace them in order to understand our own under-
standing of our times.
With Aristotle, politics was concerned with questions of being, and
of value, as well as of action. Ontology, axiology, and praxiology were
linked. Aristotle's Politics is but one half of a single treatise of which
his Ethics is the other half. Ethics was the study of how the summum
bonum could be achieved through personal action. Politics was the
study of how it could be achieved through group action. The summum
bonum was knowledge of and action in accordance with the highest
truth about man's nature and the universe. All disciplines and all hu-
man action were tied together in one root of rational truth. Politics
was the study of the implications of that rational truth for the rela-
tions between men with respect to their natural resources and with
respect to their own persons, and of appropriate group action to estab-
lish those relations and maintain them. Politics was normative: it
stated what action ought to be taken. And, because it rested on reason,
politics could never have been thought an autonomous science uncon-
cerned with morality and ethics, and with physical and biological
knowledge of man and nature.
But modern philosophy appeared to make the connection between
the true in nature, the good, and the actual in society only an illusion.
Modern philosophy seemed to require that praxiology be considered
autonomous, not linked with ontology and axiology.
Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, the philosophical fathers of positivism,
had been unable to account for the causal necessity obtaining in mathe-
matics and the new physics of Galileo and Newton. Immanuel Kant
accounted for it by endowing the human mind with certain fixed
frames (forms of sensibility and categories of the understanding)
through which it perceived and into which it fitted the data of the
senses. He put the necessity in the knowing mind, not in the matter
known.
But, as Kant pursued the study of how we know, which is episte-
mology, he realized that even as he contemplated the "starry heavens
1. Smith, Introduction to THE NICHOAMACHEAN ETHICS op ARISTOTLE Vii
(Everyman's Library ed. 1947).
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above," he also was aware of the "moral law within." Morality was
meaningless for Kant without free human choice. Therefore, he pre-
supposed man to be a free moral agent, not subject in the realm of
morality to any antecedent cause requiring a necessary effect. As, by
his own premises, all knowledge of physical matter was characterized
by precisely this causal necessity, Kant could hold this view of moral
freedom only by severing morality and ethics from all connection with
empirical scientific knowledge.2 He made that bold stroke, and the
dichotomy has stood until our own time. Without this vital connec-
tion, the rational methods of science cannot reach to a study of the
proper ends of action, but only to a study of action itself. The study
of politics must be factual only, not normative. Without the link to
objective knowledge, morality and ethics become disciplines apart, ex-
pounding the implications of arbitrary preferences.
Methodology added its bit to the illusion, arising from epistemology,
that praxiology, the study of actions, is autonomous. The scientific
method of the day was that of Newton's mechanics. It was applied to
social facts. This method required that the entities of its system obey
conservation laws, i.e., remain constant through time, the same as the
molecules and atoms of physical science. Men are not such entities if
you take them in their role of rational, moral beings. Thoughts and
values change, and differ from man to man. This would make men
not interchangeable, and any one man not constant through time.
Consequently, our modern social disciplines sought to eliminate all con-
sideration of what a man is and what he thinks good, and to build an
objective science on the observed actions of men. Political science took
political power, not the individual human being, as its basic entity.
"In both disciplines [political science and sociology] political power
seems to be accepted as an ontological datum, a natural fact, and the
role of political theory is to see to it that political power behaves with
relative decency."3
The fault of our modern social disciplines is not that they are em-
pirical, but that they can take account of nothing but the empirical.
They have been useful in many limited contexts, not because onto-
logical and axiological factors are irrelevant as exclusive empiricism
assumes, but because these factors happen to be constant in many
situations. A sociological study in a typical Midwestern small town is
not likely to be falsified by changing conceptions of the good and the
true. But an international revolutionary movement is another matter.
This is a situation where men differ in their conceptions of man's na-
ture, and of justice among men. If these differences are not irrelevant,
2. NORTURoP, THE MEETING 01 EAST AND WEST c. 5 (1946).
3. Neumann, The Concept of Political Freedom, 53 CoL. L. REv. 901 (1954).
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as the premises and method of our modern social disciplines assume
them to be, then we must hold these disciplines inadequate for the
problem at hand.
B. THE MATTER HAS-NOT BEEN SQUARELY AT ISSUE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW
Another reason why it has not been generally recognized that a
Communist-controlled society is not a State under International Law
is that traditional doctrines of recognition, taken in the light of the
prevailing exclusively empirical view of social questions, do not place
the matter squarely at issue. Communism- is revolutionary. Under
traditional doctrines of recognition, only the existence of a new gov-
ernment, is in question when Communism comes to power, not the
question of the existence of a new State. And what are the tests to de-
termine whether recognition should be granted a new government?
Charles G. Fenwick tells us:
Stability in respect to the control of the government over the
major part of the territory of the state and willingness to accept
and abide by the rules of international law-such have been the
two conditions laid down by the international lawyers in treatise
after treatise..... ,.
In the same American Journal of International Law editorial com-
ment, "The Recognition of the Communist Government of China," Dr.
Fenwick complains that, in discussing the matter, laymen do not
"make the distinction between China as a state and the Communist
Government of China."'5 But even the treatises of the international
lawyers (if one reads in the cracks where an older tradition shows
through the modern surface of exclusive empiricism) reveal that in
this instance the layman's instinct may be moi e correct than the ex-
pert's doctrines.
When "State" is defined only by its empirical manifestations a
Communist-controlled society fits the definition. A State, in modern
International Law treatises, is said to consist of (1) a ieople, (2) a
fixed territory, (3) a government, (4) which is sovereign. But even
in modern treatises indications appear that perhaps a State, in In-
ternational Law, is something more than just empirical manifesta-
tions. Oppenheim, in explaining the four conditions for the existence
of a State, says:
A people is an aggregate of individuals of both sexes who live to-
gether as a community in spite of the fact that they may belong
to different races or creeds, or be of different colour. [And, in his
4. Fenwick, The Recognition 6f the Communist Government of China, 47 Am.
J. INT'L L. 658 (1953).
5. Ibi
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1955/iss1/5
COMMUNISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
definition of government, a government is] ... one or more per-
sons who are the representatives of the people, and rule according
to the law of the land.6 [Italics added.)
Again, with respect to the definition of law, we meet with the word
"community." Laying down the essential conditions of the existence
of law, Oppenheim says, "There must, first, be a community."
A body of people, and a territory under the effective control of a
power group that calls itself a government are empirical manifesta-
tions of the existence of a State. When we turn from these to ques-
tions of "community," "representation," and "law," which begin to
suggest something of agreement on fundamental matters and of judg-
ments about right and wrong, can we say that Communist-controlled
societies are States? Can we say that an aggregate of individuals is
still living together as a community when a small minority lays down
relations for the common effort that are so hateful to the majority
they can scarcely be kept under control by informers, false propa-
ganda, mass executions, mass deportations, slave labor, and the army
itself? Are the men who exercise this control under label of govern-
ment the representatives of their victims? Does it really make no
difference whether men work together because they will or because
others drive them before the lash? August 9, 1954, a Congressional
committee reported testimony by King Michael on how the Commu-
nists dealt with Rumanians who cheered their King in front of the
Palace on St. Michael's day. King Michael said:
They arrested as many people as they could: old people, grown-
ups, and children. The children were placed in various prison
cells where they were molested or assaulted all night by special
gangs of ill and infected people. The next morning these children
were sentback to their parents with a piece of paper round their
neck expaining that they had been assaulted by a syphilitic some
time during the night, and what would happen in the future if
these demonstrations continued.$
Are the Rumanians today living as a community under a representa-
tive government? In the summer of 1942 Churchill said to Stalin,
"Tell me, have the stresses of this war been as bad to you personally
as carrying through the policy of the Collective Farms?" At that time
the German army was deep in the southern-plains bread basket of
Russia, threatening Stalingrad and the Caucasian mountain passes
beyond which lay Russia's only dependable oil supply. Stalin replied,
"Oh, no, the Collective Farm policy was a terrible struggle."' And the
struggle goes on. Is there community in Russia? Is the "law of the
6. 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw 114 (7th ed., Lauterpacht, 1948).
7. 1 id. at 10.
8. H.R. REP. No. 2650, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1954) Second Interim Report
of the Select Committee on Communist Aggression).
9. CiiuRniLL, Taz HINGE OP FATE 498 (1950).
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land' anything the Communists proclaim, or is there a line beyond
which force stands naked and is recognized as tyranny?
Dr. Fenwick suggests that such internal conditions negative the
existence of the first condition for recognition of a new government,
namely, internal stability of the regime.10 I believe the matter goes
deeper, and is a question of the true meaning of "State" in Interna-
tional Law. Accordingly, I move on to a full discussion of that ques-
tion.
PART II: THE NATURE OF A STATE UNDER INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW
A. NATURALLAW A TRUE GUIDE; BELIEF AN ELEMENT OF COMMUNITY
International Law was born before exclusive empiricism captured
the social disciplines. Grotius, who preceded Kant by nearly a century
and a half, was the father of International Law and of modern natural
law. Natural law holds that a common- belief, not just a common pat-
tern of action however induced, is essential to community. Exclusive
empiricists haVe ridiculed natural law as a bootless urchin. It was not,
and is not. Natural law is, most simply, the concept that what a people
believe to be. true about-the nature of man and the universe is the
proper criterion for deciding what is just in the relations between men
in society.
Political science, in fact, did not avoid making an assumption about
the nature of man by taking political power, rather than individual
human beings, as its basic entity. Although man's acts are said to be
the subject of study, and not man himself, the actor is inseparably in
the act, and when uniformity in the acts is'assumed (as it must be for
conservation laws to-hold) an implicit assumption is also made that
the actor is incapable of interfering with that uniformity. In power
politics, in economic statistics, in sociological studies, men are as-
sumed to be interchangeable entities-just numbers. In congressional
investigations and security hearings we too often witness the assump-
tion that a man's environmenit of twenty years ago has unchangeably
molded him-that he is not capable of reconsidering, repenting, and
reforming. Therefore, once gone astray forever damned.
Thus, our social disciplines, by trying to avoid the unavoidable,
have in fact accepted an assumption about man's nature that is anti-
thetical to -democracy. There is no logical justification for democracy
if the reason of nen can not overleap environment and perceive truth
cbmmon to all, and if men are not self-moved, by the moral sense of
duty, to work toward the good society that reason has envisaged. In
our professions of democratic faith, and overwhelmingly in our ac-
tions, we guide by moral duty and. what we believe to be true. But
10. Fenwick, supra note 4, at 660.
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our experts in the disciplines of action-when they do not smuggle in
their own morality as a corrective to their "science"-tend to be often
at war with what appears to be "common sense" to the government
administrator or business executive who has to take the action and
stand on it.11 There is a measure of truth in the epithet, "egghead."
Sir Ernest Barker, in an essay on The Parliamentary System of
Government, clearly stated the dependency of democracy upon the
view that man's behavior is subject to the creative self-direction of
reason and moral commitment:
Parliamentary liberty may be a benefit. It may be an old and
historic inheritance, as we have sought to suggest. It may be a
general and widely diffused system, which ranges from continent
to continent, as we have sought to show. But its great and sover-
eign defense is that it is the duty of man-the duty of political
man-the duty of man as a maker and member of organized
societies. Man, as a member of an organized society, must control
his life by his thought and the motion of his mind. Otherwise, he
is not a man.12
11. Antithetical doctrines have a corrosive effect on mutual confidence, cohe-
sion and cooperation, and therefore threaten the existence of a society. Psychology
has tended, until the last ten years especially, to view man as I have stated the
modern social disciplines have assumed him to be, namely, not capable of exercis-
ing rational control over his behavior. An implication of this view is that an
individual who does a socially dangerous act is not morally responsible for that
act and should not be punished for it because he acted under compulsions he
could not control. Some psychologists still call for all social deviates to be turned
over to them for treatment. ZILBOORG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL ACT
AND PUNISHMENT (1954). But Dr. Karl Menninger reports a joint case study
in which, on the same facts, "the lawyers almost to a man took the position that
the offender should, be treated as abnormal, while the psychiatrists took the posi-
tion that he should be tried as if he were normal." Hall and Menninger, Book
Review, 38 IOWA L. REV. 687, 700 (1953). Our present situation is summed up
by Dr. Menninger as a "state of confusion," whereas
[f]or centuries there was no overlapping of the areas of competence and
responsibility. To be felonious was a clearly defined state which was for the
lawyer to deal with. To be sick, on the other hand, was an equally definite
condition which was for the doctor to handle; ignorance was a-problem for
the teacher, and sin for the clergyman.
Id. at 698.
Confusion is the first symptom of social multiple sclerosis. When the cultural
tradition that the antithetical doctrines attack is less firmly implanted, the para-
lyzing effect is greater. In the Philippines, the Code Commission has actually
submitted to the Philippine Congress for adoption in three successive years a
proposed Code of Crimes that states, in Article thirty-four, that repression of
crime is "applied for social defense, to forestall social danger, to rehabilitate, cure
or educate," in contrast to the classical theory of punishment only for crime will-
fully committed in violation of a published law. Padilla, An Appraisal of the
Proposed Code of Crimes, 28 PHIL. L.J. 895, 896 (1953). In its report, ac-
companying the draft code, the Code Commission minimizes almost to extinction
the actor's knowledge and free will as elements in criminal responsibility, saying
"criminality depends mostly on social factors, environment, education, economic
conditions, and the inborn or hereditary character of the criminal himself." Ibid.
Significantly, successive rejection of the proposed Code of Crimes was chiefly due
to the organized opposition of the Catholic Lawyers' Guild of the Philippines. 13
TxE JURIST 423- (1953).
12. BARKER, The Parliamentary System of Government in ESSAYS ON GOVERN-
MZT 67 (2d ed. 1951).
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However, we do not need to rely only on negative evidence or on
unsupported assertion to have renewed confidence in natural law.
(And of course, I am speaking only of the method of natural law, not
of any particular legal norms that have resulted from the use of that
method, which, because of new insights, may now be outmoded.) Pro-
fessor F. S. C. Northrop has reforged the link that was broken by
Kant. He has gone back to the problem Kant faced and solved it in a
way that again provides epistemological and methodological meaning
in philosophy for the aphorism "the true in nature is the good in
society."13 This is an immeasurable accomplishment
We also have testimony that a common belief is the basis of com-
munity from an eminent sociologist, Pitirim A. Sorokin, who has not
swum in the main channel of empiricism. All men are faced with the
same problems of living and dying, producing and distributing, ad-
ministering and serving, ordering and respecting. But men differ in
their answers to these problems because they assign different mean-
ings to the empirical data of experience. Accepting the same set of
meanings enables men to live and work together to meet their needs
as they commonly understand them to be. For this reason, and be-
cause meanings are patterned by logic, Sorokin, after a monumental
study of all societies known to history, has called the relations between
men in society "logico-meaningfuL""
A common belief creates a common focus of valuing and judging
without which men would be at cross purposes. But to say this is not
to assert that the thing is consciously done. I am using the term 'e-
lief" as Jos6 Ortega y Gasset defined it in his excellent.essay, Concord
and Liberty:
A belief must be distinguished from an accepted idea, a scien-
tific truth, for instance. Ideas are open to discussion; they con-
vince by virtue of reason; whereas a belief can neither be chal-
lenged nor, strictly speaking, defended. While we hold a belief,
it constitutes the very reality in which we live and move and have
our being.
Beliefs, to be sure, begin as ideas. But in the process of slowly
pervading the minds of the multitude they lose the character of
ideas and establish themselves as "unquestionable realities."1 5
The belief essential to community is not a complete unanimity on
all matters, trivial as well as profound. Differences of interest and of
outlook do not destroy society if struggle resulting from them is waged
within a framework of agreement on more fundamental matters.
Ortega's superb example of this fact is Republican Rome's tribunate.
13. NORTHROP, THE LOGIC OF THE SCIENCES AND THE HuMANITIES (1947);
NORTHROP, ThE MEETING OF EAST AND WEST (1946).
14. SOROKIN, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL DYNAMICS (1937-41).
15. ORTEGA Y GAssEr, CONCORD AND LIBERTY 19, 20 (Weyl's transl. 1946).
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The tribune was a representative only of the plebs, not of the city as
a whole. He had an absolute veto.
Like the basilisk, which paralyzed whatever living being came be-
fore its eyes, the tribune could with one gesture suspend action of
any other magistrate including the consuls. He could freeze the
entire state machinery.2"
But, wonder of wonders, the tribunes, for three and a half centuries,
used their power only to prevent abuse of plebeian rights. This "sub-
lime irrationality" in the hands of one class was not used as an in-
strument of class warfare to throw off the directing, ordering, domi-
nance of the patricians, but solely as an instrument by which the plebs
could participate in the life of a community in which the patricians
alone were believed to have access to the wisdom on which laws, eco-
nomic policy, and foreign affairs could be based.
Political questions "can be resolved only if agreement prevails in
nonpolitical matters, agreement which, in the last instance, concerns
the reality of the world."' 2 Such a belief the plebeians shared with the
patricians:
They believed with living faith in the same picture of the universe
and of life in which the patricians believed. They believed in
Rome and her destiny with which they felt united for better and
for worse. They believed in the proficiency of the ruling class who
bad fought their battles year after year and won wealth, land,
and glory for the commonwealth.2"
How futile to discuss the veto in the United Nations as only a pro-
cedural matter.
Ortega cites another example of the belief essential to community,
from more recent times:
Each of the European nations lived for centuries in a state of
unity because they all believed blindly-all belief is blind-that
kings ruled "by the grace of God." To hold such a belief they
clearly had to believe in the existence of God. Which meant that
they felt they lived not by themselves, alone with their man-made
ideas, but in the ceaseless presence of an absolute entity-God-
with which they had to reckon. This indeed is belief: to reckon
with an inescapable presence. And this is reality: that which
must be reckoned with, whether we like it or not. When the peo-
ples of Europe lost the belief, the kings lost the grace, and they
were swept away by the gusts of revolution. "
B. THE BELIEF OF GROTIus' TIME: THE RATIONAL NATURE OF MAN
Grotius founded International Law upon a conception of the nature
of man that was a common belief of all Christians. The conception
was originally that of the Stoics, that the universe is characterized by
16. Id. at 48.
17. Id. at 19, 20.
18. Id. at 42.
19. Id. at 20.
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
rational order, and that men were given reason and speech by means
of which they can achieve the society necessary to their existence. The
persons Grotius quotes are Chrysostom, Marcus Aurelius, and Sen-
eca.20 Christianity, with St. Augustine and then St. Thomas, had ac-
cepted essentially the same conception.2'1 This is why the conception
was a common belief of all Christians in Grotius' time. •
Grotius says law as a rule of action "means nothing else than what
is just, and that, too, rather in a negative than in an affirmative sense,
that being lawful which is not unjust. Now that is unjust which is in
conflict with the nature of society of beings endowed with reason."22
Thus, for Grotius, the whole function of law is to preserve that society
necessary to man. Society is itself "the source of law properly so
called."2S The-society that Grotius conceived man's nafure as requir-
ing was universal society. Therefore, the obligation of every man to
all others not to disrupt society is not extinguished by the assumption
of special relations with particular men to form a state. The con-
tinuing obligation of all the members would henceforth lie upon the
head of the state who would act in their names. Therefore, the inter-
national community, like national communities, was a society of be-
ings endowed with reason.
Grotius defined the State as a "perfect association," 24 and "a com-
plete association of free men, joined together for the enjoyment of
rights and for their common interest."2 5 As Grotius well knew, Cicero
had proclaimed the rational origin of political association in very
similar terms, and also explained it by man's nature. Cicero wrote:
Well, then, a commonwealth is the property of a people. But a
people is not any collection of human beings brought together in
any sort of way, but an assemblage of people in large numbers
associated in an agreement with respect to justice and a partner-
ship for the common good. The first cause of such an association
is not so much the weakness of the individual as a certain social
spirit which nature has implanted in man.26
(1) History of Belief in Rational Nature of Man
In order to understand fully the nature of a society organized and
directed by a belief in the rational nature of man it is necessary to go,
20. 2 GROTIus, DE JURE BELLI AC PACs LIBPI TnES 11 n.1,2, and 12 n.1 (Carne-
gie Endowment ed. 1925).
21. All that is asserted is that an element of the Church's view of man was
the one derived from Greek science and philosophy and that the Church, therefore,
preserved this view as belief into Grotius' time. A complete statement of the
Church's view of man would, of course, have to include the doctrine of original
sin, which is, perhaps, "the distinction between Greek idealistic humanism and
Christian humanism.'" BRUNNER, THE SCANDAL OF CHRISTIANITY 59 (1951).
22. 2 GROTIUS, DE JuRE BELL AC PACIS Lmm TRES 34 (Carnegie Endowment
ed. 1925).
23. 2 id. at 12.
24. 2 id. at 102.
25. 2 id. at 44.
26. I CICERO, DE RE PUBLiCA xxv (Keyes' transl. 1928).
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in some detail, into the nature of Roman society before and after the
Stoic idea had become a belief. Only by so doing can we understand
fully the original conception of "State" in International Law. At the
same time we will see the full measure of difference a change of belief
makes in the structure of a society.
(a) SOCIETY BEFORE BELIEF IN RATIONAL NATURE OF MAN
Before Greek science and philosophy, the Aryan-speaking ancestors
of the Greeks and Romans believed that social and physical events
were ruled by the gods. The only way to know, to foresee, to plan, was
to consult the gods and act accordingly. Only a few men could consult
the gods. Because these men were the only avenues to Ihnowing, they
were law givers, war leaders, and economic managers for the majority
of men who, without access to the gods, would be without law, hope, or
the means of survival.2 7 This is why the plebs believed in the "pro-
ficiency of the ruling class." The plebs could know what actions hurt
their immediate interests. But, not having access to the gods, they
could not foresee what would further their interests. Therefore, they
could participate in government only negatively, through the veto of
the tribunes, not positively, by legislating. The structure of Roman
society to the time of the Empire was determined by this belief that all
things were in the hands of the gods. -Ortega points out Cicero's state-
ment that everything accomplished by the great Romans of the Re-
public was not equal in importance to "the initial feat of Romulus, who
established 'those two excellent foundations of our commonwealth, the
auspices and the senate.' ,,2, Of course! The auspices was the means
by which the gods were consulted. The senators were the patricians
who, as heads of families and clans, had the right to consult the gods.
Rome, as the Greek city-states, had been formed by leagues of family
religion-organized clans and tribes.
(b) BIRTH OF BELIEF IN RATIONAL NATURE OF MAN
The Greeks discovered a new way of knowing the world and man.
Their scientific spirit sought the general and the immutable in order
better to understand and control the particular and the transitory. By
rising above accumulation of facts to general principles and relations,
in terms of which those facts could be meaningfully explained and
previously unknown facts predicted, the Greeks discovered man's
wonderful capacity to escape the bounds of experience and know his
world more deeply and more fully than he apprehends it. They dis-
covered, in Professor Northrop's terminology, "concept by postula-
tion" knowledge.
27. The sources for the account here and following of the social background,
origin, and social impact of Stoic thought are collected in note 33 infra.
28. ORTEGA Y GAssET, Co NcoR AND LiBERTY 21 (1946).
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Using this scientific method of thought upon the observed facts then
available, the Greeks remade their conceptions of man and his world.
That they were on the right track is attested by the fact that we con-
sider them the founders of our science. The names of Plato and Aris-
totle, of course, are predominant in any account of this Promethean
task, especially with respect to the consequent revision of thought
about those facets of man's activity that we call political and social.
Both Plato and. Aristotle applied the knowledge yielded by their
particular systems of thought to the political facets of man's activity,
but in both instances the application, fundamentally, was to these ac-
tivities of man as he functioned within political groups, not to the
problem of creating political organization where none existed.2'
The Stoics did not take the State as something given, and reconcile
what they could discover about its nature with their knowledge about
man and his world. Instead, they took what Plato, Aristotle, and
other Greek scientists told them about man and the world, and on the
basis of that knowledge decided what a state ought to be. They held
that there is one rational order in the world (Plato's Logos). They
believed that man has a "sociableness," which is the necessity to enter
into a division of labor in society to survive, and that in order to ac-
complish this, man was given reason and speech. All men are rational
animals, who can know the rational order of the universe and there-
fore the proper ways for them to behave. There is one true Law (the
Logos) and all men can know it. Every man is exactly alike in this
respect-his rationality.
Being able to know the true, universal, omnipotent Law, men need
not subordinate themselves to some "god-inspired" man in order to
know their environment and to adjust to it successfully. Patricians
are no longer necessary to survival. Now all men are able to know
what justice requires in every relation of life and intercourse. There
is no difference between men based on who their ancestors were. Polity
results from the free association of equal, rational beings.
(c) THE NEW KIND OF RELATIONS BETWEEN MEN
If society is accomplished by reason and speech, the link between
men is one of ideas. The social impact of Stoic thought, which re-
sulted from the method of knowing of Greek science, 30 had this conse-
quence: The link between men became a link of "concept by postula-
tion" ideas, rather than of "concept by intuition" ideas. Concepts by
intuition denote objects which are immediately apprehended. The
29. For a fuller discussion on this point, see Dorsey, A Porch from Which To
View World Organization in FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD ORGANIZATION: A PoLITIcAL
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name for an object receives its content from immediate apprehension
and the name remains constant, i.e., it denotes the result of that ap-
prehension in whatever proposition or system of propositions it ap-
pears. When one is using concept by postulation knowledge, the name
of anything receives its content, not directly from experience, but
from the other terms in the deductively formulated system of proposi-
tions in which it appears. "Man" in a legal prescription, consequently,
is no longer some neighbor or fellow citizen, but is the kind of creature
defined in the system of concept by postulation knowledge, according
to which the society is organized.
Let me illustrate the difference. D. G. Lyon once wrote an article to
refute those who said that in contrast to the perfect logical structure
of Roman law, all previous law codes had no logical order but were
just a collection of particular rules.1' He proceeded to show that Ham-
murabi's Code (c. 21st century B.C.) had a logical structure. But what
he did not realize was that it was the logical structure of the natural
object (ie., the common sense object of experience) in its natural
history context. For instance, all the laws relating to oxen were
grouped together under a section of laws concerned with farming.
They included prescriptions on seizure of oxen for debt, annual rates
of hire of oxen, damage to oxen, and on what should be done when an
ox killed a man. Lyon considered this grouping most logical because
the ox was the principal farm animal of the Babylonians. It was, of
course, logical. But it was logical for concept by intuition organization
of a society. By contrast, the Institutes of Justinian begin with a defi-
nition of justice and jurisprudence, then proceed to: definitions of the
kinds of laws; definitions of persons who are subject to the law and of
various relations that can exist between them; division and'classifica-
tion of things; definition and classification of relations of persons to
things; transmission of rights with respect to things from one person
to another; obligationes ex contractu (obligations assumed by con-
tract) ; obligationes ex delictu (obligations the law imposes upon a
man because of some wrong he has committed, such as theft or injuri-
ous damage) ; and actiones (actions a person can institute to make ef-
fective the rights given him above). Note that Iammurabi's laws on
oxen would fall into three different places, even in this list of only the
major classifications of Roman law: seizure for debt under actiones;
annual rates of hire under obligationes ex contractu; and damage to
oxen and an ox killing a man under obligationes ex delictu.
The change to a concept by postulation link between men had far-
reaching effect. Men were not particular flesh and blood creatures, but
identical logical conceptions, possessing certain specific rights and ob-
31. Lyon, The Structure of the Hammurabi Code, 25 J. AM. ORIENTAL SOc'Y
248 (1904).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
ligations towards others in certain defined transactions. Lands or
goods were no longer physical objects but possessed the characteristics
specified in a deductively formulated, logically related body of legal
propositions.
In matters of commerce and trade the actual articles themselves, or
symbols literally representing them, were no longer manipulated as
formerly they were, but men did business by manipulating concepts.
Take the transaction antichresis, the forerunner of the modern mort-
gage. Mr. Black had land and needed money. Mr. White had money
that he wanted to work for him. The land was literally exchanged for
the money for a period of years. Black moved off the land. White had
full use of it. White turned over his money to Black, who could pay it
back at the expiration of a certain period and move back on his land.
Where the actual physical articles could not be exchanged, various
symbols represented literally the articles, and were manipulated ac-
cording to-exact rituals. If the ritual was faulty in any small detail,
the exchange was not accomplished, and the transaction was not com-
pleted. That was the nature of Roman law until the influence of con-
cept by postulation knowledge began to be felt. Then Roman law rec-
ognized certain "formless juristic acts" as completing transactions,
and the intention of the parties was decisive rather than the exactness
of the ritual. This is in accord with the new conception that relations
between men in society are created by the rational faculty of those
men themselves, their expressed intentions-rather than being laid
down ritualistically by the gods speaking through oracles and priests.
Rudolph Sohm has said:
The whole future course of development [of Roman law] was
virtually involved in this recognition. Thus the end of the Re-
public marks the commencement of the process by which the local
law of the city of Rome was gradually converted into what Roman
law was destined, at a future time, to be, viz., a general law for
the civilized world32
No longer were transactions carried out between men qua men, but
between "buyer" and "seller," "pledgor" and "pledgee," "mortgagor"
and "mortgagee," etc., all of whom had definite, specific rights and ob-
ligations set down in the laws. No longer did laws begin, as did Ham-
murabi's, "Any man who...." Instead, man, in any particular statute,
did not refer to the common sense creature we know in everyday ex-
perience, but to precisely the kind of creature-and no other--defined
by the whole body of hierarchically ordered, logically related, body of
propositions specifying the relations between creatures of such and
such a nature living in a world of such and such characteristics, all
as determined by the postulational knowledge of Greek science and
32. SOHM, THE INSTITUTES 69 (3d ed. 1907).
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worked out in its normative consequences by the art of deducing, ar-
ranging, and proving propositions. 3
The change to a concept by postulation link between men made pos-
sible a much more complex, far-flung community. Men are conceptual
entities. Things are conceptual entities. And, for the first time, purely
conceptual legal entities can be formed, such as the corporation, so
important to modern economic organization. These made possible the
linking of large numbers of persons in a common enterprise in which
only the enterprise itself is a legal person, and the individuals have
certain limited liabilities and rights. Justice is not in the hands of
particular men's gods, but in the hands of judges trained in jurispru-
dence and sworn to uphold the impersonal, universal law, before which
all men are equal.
(d) THE NEW STRUCTURE OF LAW
For centuries Roman law had been only "a series of legal rules,"
with no more logical structure than the Code of Hammurabi. Stoicism
made its impact on the intellectuals of Rome and thirty years later,
around 100 B.C., Q. Mucius Scaevola, a Stoic, wrote an eighteen volume
treatise in which Roman law suddenly began to present the logical
structure that caused 2douard Cuq to assert that "the Romans have
fixed for all time the categories of juristic thought."' 4 For the first
time Roman law was
set forth in systematic order, i.e., arranged and classified accord-
ing to the nature of the subjects dealt with ... [Scaevola] was
the first to determine, in clear outline, the nature of the legal
institutions (will, legacy, guardianship, partnership, sale, hiring,
etc.), and their various kinds (genera) .3
83. The foregoing account of Stoic thought and its impact appeared (substan-
tially) as part of my paper for the Eleventh Conference on Science, Philosophy
and Religion, that became c. 33 of FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD ORGANIZATION: A1
POLITICAL AND CULTURAL APPRAISAL (Bryson, Finkelstein, Lasswell, and MacIver
ed. 1952). It is based on the following: ARISTOTLE. POLITICS (Barker's transl.
1946); ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. 5 (Chase's transl. 1947); ARNOLD,
ROMAN STOICISM (1911); CIcERo, DE LEGIBUS (Keyes' transl. 1928); CIcERo, DE
RE PUBLICA (Keyes' transl. 1928); DECLAREUIL, ROME THE LAW-GIVER (1926);
FUSTEL DE COULANGES, THE ANCIENT CITY (7th ed. 1889); GREENDGE, A HAND-
BOOK OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1889); MILHAUD, LEcONS SUR LES
ORIGINS DE LA SCIENCE GlECQUE (1893); 1 MOMMSEN, HISTORY OF RO.ME (Dick-
son's transl. 1900); NASMITH, -OUTLINE OF ROMAN HISTORY (1890); NILSSON,
GREEK PIETY (Rose's transl. 1948); NORTHROP, THE LOGIC OF THE SCIENCES AND
THE HUMANITIES (1947); PLATO, REPUBLIC (3d ed. 1921) ; ROSTOVTZEF., HISTORY OF
THE ANCIENT WORLD (2d ed. 1930); THE CIVIL LAW (Scott's transl. 1932); SOHM,
THE INSTITUTES (3d ed. 1907); 1 VINOGRADOFF, OUTLINES OF HISTORICAL JURIS-
PRUDENCE (1920); 2 VINOGRADOFF, OUTLINES OF HISTORICAL JURISPRUDENCE(1922); 1 WESTRUP, INTRODUCTION TO EARLY ROMAN LAW (1944); 2 WESTRUP,
INTRODUCTION TO EARLY ROMAN LAW (1934); 3 WESTRUP, INTRODUCTION TO EARLY
ROMAN LAW (1939); Northrop, The Mathematical Background and Content of
Greek Philosophy in PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS FOR ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD(1936). See Dorsey, Two Objective Bases for a World-Wide Legal Order in
IDEOLoGICAL DIFFERENCES AND WORLD ORDER 442 (Northrop ed. 1949).
34. 1 CUQ, LES INSTITUTIONS JURIDIQUES DEs ROMAINS XXiV (1904).
35. SoHM, op. cit. supra note 33, at 9L
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Jurisprudence was born. There was suddenly a science of law where
none existed before. Sohm indicates the difference in these words:
A scientific exposition, for example, would never run as follows:
If a thing has been delivered to you under a contract of sale, you
have the right to keep it, and a third party into whose possession
it comes is bound to hand it over to you. [This is the kind of lan-
guage you will find in Hammurabi's Code.] The scientific exposi-
tion would be in this fashion. First, ownership is a right, un-
limited in its contents, to exercise control over a thing. Thus we
get the conception of ownership. Secondly, ownership can be
acquired by traditio, occupatio, usucapio, &c. (each of these terms
being defined). Thus in place of a series of legal rules we have a
number of abstract conceptions .... 36
I have attempted to establish elsewhere that the Greek way of know-
ing, with its implications for social organizations made explicit by
Stoicism, was responsible for the startling, and immensely important,
change in Roman larrY This source of change is not discernible to
modern sociology because it lies outside its premises. Eugen Ehrlich,
one of the greatest of sociological jurisprudents, was fully aware of
"[t] he enormous revaluation of all human life *at the end of the Re-
public and in Imperial times....3 8 But Ehrlich, though he gave years
of study to the matter, was unable to determine the source of the
change. He claimed for himself
the credit of having shown in my Beitrdige zur Theorie der Rechts-
quellen that Roman juristic science has created its material inde-
pendently of any other source of law. The main root of the
Roman law is the proprium ius civile, i.e., the juristic law which
the jurists themselves have created.... Although in form an in-
terpretation of the Twelve Tables, this ius civile was an absolutely
independent creation of the Roman jurists.39
Ehrlich expressed intention to publish a second volume in which he
would examine information he hoped would furnish the answer to the
question where the jurists got their material for remaking the Roman
law. He never fulfilled the intention, though he lived for a number of
years after expressing it
(e) NEW STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY; NEW CONTENT OF LAW
Stoicism influenced Roman society directly as instruction in the
home, foreshadowing a "theory of education," training the young,
regulating the daily life of adults .4 Thus, new conceptions of social
justice were implanted, and the law was changed indirectly. If all
human beings are rational, women are the equal of men, and indi-
viduals are discrete entities possessing rights and obligations apart
36. §OHM, op. cit. supra note 33, at 32, 33.
37. Dorsey, supra note 33.
38. EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 261 (Moll's
transl. 1936).
39. Ibid.
40. ARNoLD, op. cit. supra note 33, at c. 12-15.
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from status in family and clan. Through the flexible formulary pro-
cedure of the late Republic daughters and cognates as well as sons and
agnates were allowed to inherit property. Indeed, until the notion of
individuality arising out of Greek thought began to make itself felt,
there was no conception of private property. Property belonged to the
family. And the family was not a community of living persons only
but a continuity between past, present and future family heads, or
paterfamilii. Family is the living personality of the first house-father,
his vital force, which has found immortality in the continuity of the
generations of his descendants. His eldest son receives it through the
blood and alone has a right to carry on the family religion. He is the
living generation's link with the gods.4 1 "Now mankind . . .are im-
mortal, because they leave children's children behind them, and par-
take of immortality in the unity of generation." 42
It was to the family so understood-continuing through the genera-
tions of descendants-that property belonged. The eldest son, upon
becoming paterfamilias, did not inherit the property. He inherited the
right to act with respect to the property owned by the continuing fam-
ily. He could not refine the inheritance even if all he received were
heavy debts. The paterfamilias could not make a will that would leave
the property to persons outside the family. But this was gradually
broken through. Wills were allowed. The son could refuse inheri-
tance. And, as mentioned above, daughters-who previously had al-
ways been subordinated to some male because males alone inherited
the right to consult the gods and therefore were the only ones who
could act wisely and justly-were allowed to inherit
Not only did Stoic thought enter Roman society directly and Roman
law indirectly, but also the reverse was occurring, and perhaps to an
even larger extent. It was a social revolution unrivaled until our own
time. C. H. McIlwain, speaking of the change at this period-through
formulary procedure-of property law, says:
It was nothing less than a gradual and silent social revolution, if
we consider that a similar transformation was going on in every
branch of law-the law of marriage, of family relations, of testa-
mentary succession, of contracts, and, in fact, of all human re-
lations.
There is probably no other social revolution in recorded history
so important, so complete, so continuous over so long a period, as
this evolution traceable step by step in the sources of Roman pri-
vate law.43
41. See authorities cited in note 33 sapra. I have put some of my research on
these matters, in comparison with early Chinese society, into mimeograph form
and have used it in St. Louis and Taipei, Taiwan, China. Professor Northrop has
used it at New Haven, Connecticut, but it is not published in generally available
form.
42. PLATO, LAws bk. IV, 721 (Jowett's trans]. 1892).
43. MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALIS.M, ANCIENT AND MODERN 54 (1940).
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In so thorough a revolution we would expect of Rome, especially, that
change would be forced by law as well as upon law. For it was Cicero
who said:
[TIhe citizen who compels all men, by the authority of magis-
trates and the penalties imposed by law, to follow rules of whose
validity philosophers find it hard to convince even a few by their
admonitions, must be considered superior even to the teachers
who enunciate these principles. For what speech of theirs is
excellent enough to be preferred to a State well provided with law
and custom?"
I have already mentioned the Stoic, Q. Mucius Scaevola, who is rec-
ognized as the founder of Roman law. Ehrlich says Roman juristic
science "created its material independently of any other source of
law.' 45 Of fourteen lawyers whom Herbert Jolowicz lists" as laying
the foundation for and developing the Roman science of jurisprudence
under the Republic, Arnold names eleven as men who were Stoics or
were strongly influenced by Stoicism. Of the remaining three, one was
the father of a Stoic, and of another Jolowicz says nothing is known.
After Scaevola, the most prominent of these was the Stoic, S. Sulpicius
Rufus, a contemporary and- intimate friend of Cicero, who was ac-
knowledged as the head of his profession and who compiled 180 books
on law. The highest point of Roman jurisprudence was in the reigns
of the Antonines, of whom Marcus Aurelius wis, of course, a noted
Stoic."
(2) Rational Nature of Man as Basis of State Shown in Assumption
of a Distinguished Modern History of the State
But for the weight of argument required to press a new focus upon
the mind's eye, I could have eliminated the above excursus on Stoic
thought and its impact on Roman law, and been content to cite the
opening paragraph of Professor McIlwain's The Growth of Political
Thought in the West. Here is a book that attempts, as Professor
McIlwain tells us in his preface,
to set forth in moderate compass and with the greatest possible
clearness the development of our ideas about the state and about
government, beginning with the fifth-century B.C. in Greece and
extending as far as the end of the middle ages.48
In his long and excellent first paragraph McIlwain states the funda-
mental questions, the answers to which will complete the volume. In
that paragraph, one fundamental matter does not appear as question
but as assumption. That is the rational nature of man:
44. CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA bk. IV, ii (Keyes' transL 1928).
45. See note 38 supra.
46. JOLOWICZ, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ROMAN LAW 90, 91
(2d ed. 1952).
47. See Dorsey, Two Objective Bases for a World-Wide Legal Order in IDEO-
LOGICAL DIFFERENCES AND WORLD ORDER 442, 463 (Northrop ed. 1949).
48. McILWAIN, THE GROWTH OF POLITICAL THOUGHT IN THE WEST V. (1932).
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Dominion if it is to be justified at all must be "a condition of
rational nature" as Wycliffe defined it, and in reason permanent
government must have a justification sufficient to explain the
historical fact of its continuous existence among rational beings.
• . . [W]here does "rational nature" require that the dominant
power be lodged; . . . how does this "rational nature" prescribe
that this power shall be exercised, wherever lodged?"
(3) Origin of the Conception of Rational Thought
The rational nature of man is, indeed, an essential assumption in
the political thought culminating in the modern State. But this as-
sumption had its own origin and development. Not until men turned
their thoughts from the question, "What do the gods require?" to the
questions "What is the world?" and "What is man?" could the idea of
the innate dignity and worth of the individual human being begin to
be conceived. Not until answers to these questions began to have effect
in changing the daily lives of the people could that idea grow into a
belief and be accepted as unquestioned reality, "the one and only
power that checks and disciplines man from within."38
Louis Gernet, in a semantic study of the moral and juridical thought
of Greece, very interestingly notes the coincidence of the very notion
of reason itself with the emergence of the mode of thought we call
scientific:
Through the words which have interested us, we have seen
worked out some of the fundamental notions under which human-
ity still lives, the abstract notions of delict, of the person as sub-
ject to laws, of individual responsibility; and it is from the same
movement that we have seen emerge the rational thought and
have seen asserted the idea of the individual. For the conditions
which here dominate the development of moral thought and the
reflection of men and of society on themselves are also those, for
one part, which command the birth of scientific thought and re-
flection on the external world... the notion of "injustice" tends
to become positive at the same time that the first natural philos-
ophers propose a true object of knowledge; the moment of transi-
tion marks itself in the first cosmologies of the philosophers... .51
[Italics added.]
C. THE MODERN STATE: A COMMUNITY FORMED AND DIRECTED BY
REASON
Thus, we see that at the beginning of the modern era, the concep-
tion of State was a community formed and directed by reason. In the
universal state of Christendom, and in the absolute monarchies of a
later period, that which reason required was pronounced by God's
49. Id. at 1, 2.
50. ORTEGA Y GASsEr, CoNcoRD AND LIBERTY 20 (1946).
51. GERNEr, RECHERCHES SUR LE DEVELOPPENMENT DE LA PENSEE JURIDIQUE E
MORALE E. GPRcE 432, 433 (1917). The passage quoted is my translation.
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vicars on earth.- The universal order was revealed only to a few, who,
by the grace of God, would teach the many what reason required by
ruling over them. The common man was as dependent upon the ex-
pert as he had been in the old days when truth was conceived to be
written in the mind of the heathen gods. Polity was a province of
theology.
But the modern State is founded not only upon a universal, rational
order, but upon a reading of that order by the reason of common men.
McIlwain points out that sovereignty, "in its only correct and modern
meaning is legislative sovereignty..." and that legislation is not the
medieval finding of a precept that is binding because in accord with
universal reason, but is the making of a rule that is binding because
of the authority of the social organ men have created for this pur-
pose. 52 Grotius himself was the father of modern natural law, as well
as the father of modern international law:
What we have been saying [about the nature of man and society]
would have a degree of validity if we should concede that which
cannot be conceded without utmost wickedness, that there is no
God, or that the affairs of men are of no concern to HinL53
The same precedence of rational investigation of nature over theology
as the basis of polity is expressed in the opening sentence of our Dec-
laration of Independence:
When in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for
one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected
them with another, and to assume among the Powers of the earth,
the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and
of Nature's God entitle them....
D. TOTAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN STATES AND COMMUNITIES NOT DI-
RECTED BY REASON HAS ALWAYS BEEN RECOGNIZED IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW
It is, I trust, now clear that a State, in its original meaning in Inter-
national Law, was not any aggregate of people, working together in
any way to utilize the resources of a fLxed territory, and living under
the effective control of any kind of independent government In the
European, Christian international community, a State was a commu-
nity of people working together in, and living under an independent
government organized in, an atmosphere of belief in the rational na-
ture of man. The communities in our own stream of Western civiliza-
tion that were organized according to the earlier belief that men were
dependent upon the gods we call City-States in order to distinguish
them from States. Islamic and Far Eastern communities were not
accepted as States in International Law until they became "civilized."
52. MCILwVAIN, THE GROWTH OF POUTICAL THOrGHT IN THE WEST 390 (1932).
53. 2 GROTIUS, DE JuRE BELLI AC PAciS LiaR Tr.s 13 (Carnegie Endowment
ed. 1925).
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This is an ego-centric (or should I say civilo-centric?) way of saying
that these communities were not States and could not be accepted in a
law-governed community of States until they changed their laws to
reflect an organization of Society based on reason rather than, as we
assumed, on irrational religious mysticism--or some other derogatory
characterization, always preceded by "irrational." Until the relations
between men in these societies were determined by laws copied from
Western codes, men from "civilized" nations would not accept such
obviously "unjust" and "barbaric" social norms as applying to them.
Therefore, extraterritoriality was considered necessary.
These societies were organized and directed by beliefs concerning
"the reality of the world" that were radically different from ours. 54
They had radically different pictures "of the universe and of life."
Thinking itself was different with them and appeared to us to be not
"logical."' Leaving aside the assumptions of inferiority obvious in
the terms by which the distinction was expressed, the distinction be-
tween these societies and States was perfectly correct.
My point is that a difference of equal magnitude, a difference of
kind, a difference on ultimate matters, now exists between States and
Communist-controlled societies. Having examined the original concep-
tion of State in International Law, let us proceed to an examination of
the nature of a Communist-controlled society.
PART III: THE NATURE OF A COMM]JUNIST-CONTROLLED
SOCIETY
A. HISTORY AS THE CRITERION OF THE GOOD SOCIETY; THE GERIMANS,
THE COMMUNISTS
The belief that is the basis of community, or society (for in the
sense relevant here both mean a working-together group), amounts
to an answer to the question, "What is the basis of human cooperation
and united action?" Among the Aryan ancestors of the Greeks and
Romans, the answer was "common gods." The origin of this answer
is beyond our view in antiquity. The answer of Western civilization,
until the advent of Hegel and Marx, was "reason." The origin of that
answer was in natural philosophy. However, in the great reappraisal
that followed the Renaissance and the Reformation this source could
not be looked to because of the estrangement, discussed above, 6 that
was taking place between natural philosophy and the social disciplines.
54. Dorsey, Constitutions in Depth, 4 J. OF SC!CIAL SCIENCE 1 (1953) (Pub-
lished by the College of Law, National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan,
China.).
55. Dorsey, Two Objective Bases for a World-Wide Legal Order in IDEOLOGICAL
DIFFEnRENCES AND WORLD ORDErt 442, 452 (Northrop ed. 1949).
56. See p. 2 et seq. supra.
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Of the disciplines dealing with human action none was broad enough
in scope but history.
History's answer to such a question must be factual only. So long as
the answer is suitably vague and is used only to produce a benign and
superior attitude in its votives, no active injury is done. Toynbee's
"challenge and response" has not been taken up by Utopians and has
not been known to result in the death or imprisonment of anyone. But
when history's factual answer is used normatively, heads fall testa-
ment to a law of survival-that error means death. With Hegel, his-
tory was the dialectical unfolding of the creative human spirit. But,
by the necessity of uniformity arising out of Kant's categories and
forms, the creative human spirit had to be that of a "transcendental
ego." His answer to the root question regarding community was, in
effect, "unity and cooperation result from the environment of group
mind." I shall not here attempt to discuss the tragic social effects of
this answer. No better analysis of Germany's turning away from the
common Western-civilization traditions of natural law and humanism
could be found than the one Ernst Troeltsch made after World War 1.5
Marx and Engels, on the basis of another interpretation of history,
answered; in effect, "'unity and cooperation result from economic class
environment." This answer has been given political life as the direct-
ing idea of communism. According to this answer, reason cannot over-
leap circumstance because consciousness is controlled by economic
class environment It is not that dialectically unfolding history will
accomplish all, and men need not plan the future or work to make it
happen. But it is a matter of where one is to look for reliable knowl-
edge on the basis of which to plan. Life is possible only if men work
together and if they guide their actions by a true understanding of the
environment in which they struggle to survive. If truth is written in
the minds of the gods, community, to succeed, must be organized and
directed according to the will of the gods, and that will must be sought
in the only way it can be learned-through the men and the cere-
monies by which access to the gods is attained. If truth is written in
reason (a rational order in the universe), it can be read by rational
creatures, and if all men are rational, all men can participate in plan-
ning and directing the common life in community-the many need not
participate only by accepting and obeying. But if truth is written in
history it must be read in history and the common good requires that
the many be dependent upon the few who know what history requires.
With the Germans it was the mystics who could read the m-.ll of the
Volk. With the Communists it is those who, by revolutionary experi-
ence and dialectical awareness, are at the Van where they can see the
57. Troeltsch, The Ideas of National Law and Humanity in GIERKE, WORLD
PoLiTIcs IN NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF SOciETY 201 (Barker's transL
1950).
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next stage of history through the chinks in decaying capitalism. What
the ordinary worker believes to be the good society must be rejected
and denied for his own good, because, since his consciousness is con-
trolled by economic class environment, his opinions will not be reliable
until he has lived under the material conditions of the good society,
i.e., the classless society. Until that time his "reason" will be a snare
and a delusion.
In assessing the difference between a Communist society and non-
Communist societies, our exclusively empirical social disciplines have
again misled us. If the political structure, the econ9mic structure, the
social structure, of a Communist society are compared with those of
Western democracies, the full measure of difference is missed. Even
the catalogue of atrocities that is compiled from a study of how these
structures operate in practice do not awaken us to the full difference
because the new in society always carries a price in human suffering.
The full importance of difference is not in structure or function, but
in origin of structure and function. "They want socialism. Well, so do
some of the countries of Western Europe. They are not so different
after all. We can deal with them." But Communists want socialism
not because the reason of the people has reached the answer that so-
cialism will be a better society for them, and the people have selected
their representatives to say this in national councils and to act for
them in nationalizing industry. The Communists want socialism be-
cause history says it is the next and final stage, the denouement of
class struggle, and it is the duty of those in the van to impose it upon
the exploited workers-by force, or falsehoods, as may be necessary-
in order to save them, even from themselves.
Should the Utopian stage ever be reached, Communist society
would be a community where everyone participated in planning and
directing the common effort. Short of that-and, if we are right
about man's nature, it can never happen-the role of the common
man is only to accept and obey. He can, in nothing, plan and direct.
By brute force, terror, informers, propaganda, by control of food,
clothing, shelter, opportunity and respect, by youth training, the his-
tory-directed community discourages any show of independent judg-
ment by the common citizen. By using the same instruments as
carrots instead of sticks, and by mass rallies, one-slate elections,
decoration of military or workers' heroes, cell meetings, study groups,
the history-directed community secures acceptance of, and whips up
enthusiasm for, the decisions of the controlling few.
Such communities, and the governments they set up, are atavistic.
They deny, implicitly, everything that Western civilization has
learned, because they have turned from the way of knowing that has
structured and sustained the communities of Western civilization.
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"What is man?" has become a mockery. Man as man has no worth.
To have worth, man must be Aryan, a party member, or a laborer.
"I love my fellow men, except.. ." is the great self-evident lie of our
times.
Communities organized and directed by reason differ among them-
selves. But this is because rational beings may reach different an-
swers, particularly when their experience differs. Thus, differences
of structure, and of function, may occur among them. But the differ-
ence between all reason-directed communities, and Communist-con-
trolled societies is a matter not of the answer, but of the method by
which an answer is arrived at. It is a difference of the criterion of
truth, and of justice. The Communist revolution was not a revolution
within the tradition of Western civilization, such as the English, the
American, and the French. These were the working out, by force, of
the basic belief that the State is an association of rational beings,
"joined together for the enjoyment of rights and for their common
interest." These revolutions put planning and directing, on the basis
of what reason requires, in the hands of the people-taking it from
the hands of the few, who were-no longer accepted as chosen of God.
These revolutions severely tried community in those nations. But,
at least, the criterion of truth remained unchanged.
B. THE EFFECT ON THE LIFE OF THE ORDINARY MAN
Let us briefly compare the situation of the ordinary man passing
under a new sovereignty in Grotius' time with his situation upon
coming under Communist domination in the present world. Residents
of territory passing from the domain of one prince to another were
absolved from their old allegiance and required to swear allegiance
to the new sovereign and lord of that territory. But their ultimate
allegiance was to the same God. Passing from the domain of a Cath-
olic prince to that of a Protestant prince entailed changes in how to
worship God and learn His will. These were serious matters, as the
history of massacres, persecutions, emigrations, and wars will show.
But at least the question of whether to worship, or what God to wor-
ship -was not involved. Today, coming under Communist domination
means active government opposition to all allegiance to God, and is,
therefore, a matter of the soul.
Under this prince or that, the man who made his living from the
land most likely found his economic world unchanged. The work he
did, the duties he owed to others, the rights he had against them, the
way he harvested and sold his crops, the share of the harvest that was
his, all these would be the same. His life was hard. It would stay
hard. But it would stay. He would not be rooted up from the soil
and sent into a factory, a mine, or; a road building crew.
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In the guild towns, where manufacture and commerce were chal-
lenging agriculture as a source of wealth, production and trade would
go on as before. The laws governing commerce, like the law of the
sea, were not the blessing of any one prince but a code among com-
munities where experience was common and intercourse necessary.
Whether in town or country, men who passed under a new sovereign
still knew the next day how to go about earning food, clothing and
shelter for their families. There was no extensive disruption and
readjustment in the means and mode of existence. Today, coming
under Communist domination means complete economic transforma-
tion, and is, therefore, a matter of the body.
In the Europe of Grotius' time there was always a master or a
guild, a lord or a prince, depending upon the scale of the com.munitr
affected, to make decisions that affected the general welfare. Passing
under a different prince might have no effect whatsoever upon town
and county decisions. National decisions would be made by a different
prince but princes were all pretty much alike anyway. Education, in
monasteries or universities, would be unaffected. Today, coming
under Communist domination means subordination of all thought and
coordination of all decisions at every level of community with central
party directives, and is, therefore, a matter of the mind.
When International Law was being formulated, passing under a
different sovereign was a matter of public importance but of very
little personal importance. In the present world the change, if it is a
change to a Communist government, touches every citizen in every
fiber and cell of his being-in body, mind, and soul. The price of ad-
mission to a "people's democratic republic," as to the Kingdom of
Heaven, is to be born anew.
C. THE EFFECT ON LEGAL CONCEPTIONS
The change from reason to history as the basis of organizing and
directing community life is the most radical revolution in Western
civilization in two thousand years. It is difficult to assess the magni-
tude of contemporary change. The change in Roman society caused
by the advent of Stoic thought is two thousand years behind us, and
we can better comprehend its completeness-the way in which society
revolved in every aspect of valuing, judging, and acting. This change
I have sketched abovess in the change in Roman private law-the place
McIlwain suggests it can best be traced. Law is the hallmark of a
society of equal, rational beings. Rome was the first attempt to build
such a society, and, therefore, the Romans invented the "categories
of juristic thought." It was supposed by tdouard Cuq, and it was a
58. See pp. 9-18.
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general supposition, that legal institutions, such as will, legacy, con-
tract, describing relationships between men in a society of rational
beings, would always be nedded. Therefore, Cuq remarked that "the
Romans have fixed for all time the categories of juristic thought."' "
Perhaps the best measure of the depth, and completeness of the Com-
munist revolution is that in a Communist society there is a need to
reject old categories of juristic thought and create new ones. Con-
tract is the instrument by which rational beings plan and direct the
production and distribution of goods. Since the planning and direct-
ing is to be shared by many, some delineation must be made of areas
of authority. Control of property (ownership, lease, agency) serves
this function. Each man plans and directs with respect to that
property he controls. Therefore, Roman law, quite logically, proceeds
from a definition of persons, to a definition and classification of things,
then to definition and classification of relations of persons to things,
the ways in which rights with respect to things may be transmitted
from one person to another, and only then to contract, or the way in
which persons agree to exchange things.
Practically all the legal conceptions of the person, of corporations
and other associations, of the various kinds of property, of ownership,
trust, lease, agency, sale, mortgage, gift, inheritance, and contract
are unnecessary or subject to radical change in a society where all
planning and directing is done by a few history gazers. All property
must be kept under their control. This is essential-the benchmark.
This eliminates the need for, or makes inapt, conceptions of various
modes of private control over property, the ways such control is
transmitted, and contracting with respect to such property. Com-
munists are just becoming fully aware that their revolution requires
completely new legal conceptions to describe the relationships of re-
sponsibility in a socialist society. As late as 1948 Professor A. V.
Venediktov, in his Socist State Property, expressed the view that
means of production when in the control of a state enterprise were
the property of the collective of workers in that enterprise as well as
the property of the state as a whole. His book received the Stalin
prize and was accepted at the time as the most learned and authorita-
tive text.60 It was likewise generally accepted that the transfer of
products from one state enterprise to another was a purchase and sale
relationship. These conceptions were inconsistent with the bench-
mark of Communist socialism because the former would give groups
of persons, if not individuals, the control requisite to planning and
directing, and the latter describes a relationship as having arisen by
59. See note 34 supra.
60. 5 Sovixr STT.inEs 215 (1953).
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the will of a small group of individuals, rather than by the will of the
state as a whole.
In early 1953, in Voprosy Filosofi, the foremost Soviet philosophical
journal, the demand was made that these errors be corrected. The
article rejected Professor Venediktov's view of socialist state prop-
erty, saying that such a conception
weakens the principle of one-man management and leads to the
incorrect conclusion that ownership and management of state
property belong not to the state itself in the person of its re-
sponsible authorized representatives, but to the collective of
workers and employees, which is wholly incorrect both from the
theoretical and the practical point of view.61
The article takes to task the authors of the textbook on civil law for
expressing the same view, and then sets the criterion:
In order to overcome this confusion, it is necessary to have as
a starting point the absolutely clear indications given by Stalin
in his reply to Comrade Notkin that 'the owner of the means of
production-the state-in transferring these to a given enter-
prise in no way abandons its right of property to the means of
production, but, on the contrary, retains it in full', that 'directors
of enterprises, having received the means of producing from the
state, not only do not become their owners, but are, on the con-
trary, confirmed as authorized representatives of the Soviet state
for the purpose of utilizing the means of production in accordance
with the plans laid down by the state' (J. Stalin, Economic Prob-
lems of Socialism in the USSR).62
The Voprosy Filosofi article goes on to attack the sale-and-purchase
conception and to prod Soviet jurists for new conceptions:
Incorrect [too] is the traditional view which considers the
supply of the means of production by one state enterprise to
another sale-and-purchase relationships. Comrade Stalin says
perfectly clearly that the state does not sell the means of produc-
tion, but distributes them among its enterprises. It is obvious
that contracts concerning supplies from one socialist organiza-
tion to another are fundamentally different from purchase and
sale contracts, and Soviet jurists must probe more deeply into
the specific nature of this question by casting off outmoded
dogmas and principles.
Many formulae and conceptions of legal scienc3 do not corre-
spond to socialist relationships, but reflect the influence of bour-
geois jurisprudence. . . . [And, as to the Roman origin of the
conceptions] [ilt is doubtful whether legal science really needs
such an normous number of Latin words... 6 3
D. THE EFFECT ON LoGic
Not only is the source of truth different with the Communists than
with Western-civilization States, but also the very process of thinking
61. 5 id. at 217.
62. 5 id. at 218.
68. 5 id. at 217, 218.
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
itself is conceived differently by them. A universal, immutable, ra-
tional order means that we postulate the existence of certain eternal
objects and of fixed, everlasting relations between them. This is the
basis of our understanding of reality. All thinking proceeds from
this basis by chains of inference. The process, and the study of it,
are known as logic.14 Christian theology and natural law alike find
their origins in this assumption and their content by this process.
The content and structure of particular systems of law, and the net-
work of relations in a society, are likewise derived by the same process
of thinking-as I have sketched above with respect to Roman society
and law. 5 The Communists assert that the relations between objects
or things in the real world are not fixed and everlasting, but change
with the dialectic process of history. They assert tat the only reason
why non-Communists think of reality as characterized by fixed order
is that the consciousness of the ordinary person-one who has not
learned to think dialectically-reflects the order of things obtaining
at one historical moment, in a particular society, and in a particular
class. "Dialectical thinking" avoids this error by seeing reality as a
living, changing process, instead of static, lifeless. Thus, they believe,
Communist logic sees reality in its fullness, and "bourgeois" logic
sees reality only as a flash photo. Bourgeois government, then, falsi-
fies and seeks to deny reality by attempting to keep society forever
in that static state.8 (What is to be expected from negotiation with
men who conceive truth and thought itself differently than we do?)
This conception of thinking, as the conception of the source of
truth, is part of the total error of autonomous praxiology. The error
is in treating social facts as autonomous instead of as resulting from
men acting as they did because they believed it right to act in that
way-because they held certain things to be true. In the main stream
of Western civilization, only the perfect society, the City of God, has
fixed relations. All actual societies have imperfect relations, resulting
from the imperfect reason of human beings, and subject to change
as men's -reason discovers new truth. Social reality is constantly
changing. Only the reality of nature is conceived as fixed. What man
is, what the universe is, remains the same-though our understanding
of it, and thus the knowledge available to us on the basis of which to
act, changes. What is good, and what ought to be done, likewise are
fixed once and for all, in the sense that we postulate the existence of
eternal goodness and eternal justice as well as the existence of eternal
truth. But our conceptions of what is good and what is right change
as our knowledge of the nature of man and the universe changes
64. Space does not permit this generalization 'to be modified by a consideration
of inductive and mathematical logic.
65. See pp. 9-18.66. Campbell, The Soviet Concept of Logic, 3 Sovir STUDIES 278 (1952).
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because they derive from that knowledge. It is this method of deriva-
tion that F. S. C. Northrop has restored to philosophy-reforging
the link that was broken by Kant.67
PART IV: THE COMMUNIST-CONTROLLED SOCIETY AND
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Professor Northrop's work is all important because it restores the
epistemological and methodological foundation of the natural law
tradition of Western civilization. Without the restoration of that
foundation we would have no standing to judge the history-directed
communities. We would ourselves be dependent upon autonomous
praxiology in all social questions. The Communist organization of a
community based upon control and coercion of the many by the few
is equally a fact with the Western democratic organization of com-
munities based upon the self-control of their affairs by rational beings
through elected representatives. Exclusively empirical disciplines can
take account of beliefs, but only in an empirical way, Thus, even if
they should consider the question of beliefs, autonomous social dis-
ciplines would simply tell us that it is a fact that some communities
are organized on the basis of a belief in dialectical history as the
criterion of truth, and some are organized on the basis of a belief
in reason as the criterion of truth, others on various theologies. As
long as our own thought and judgment on social questions are re-
stricted to autonomous praxiology we can not say one organization of
society, or one belief, is better or more right than another. All have
equal standing as social facts.
It is only when we guide by inferences from natural facts that we
can choose between social facts on the basis of anything other than
subjective preference. We ask ourselves the question, "What is man?"
Our answer is that he is a rational creature living in a world char-
acterized by universal rational order and needing society. We observe
two social facts, communities organized and directed by reason, and
communities organized and directed by history. We can say the
former is good because the inference from the rational nature of man
is that he will be living in accordance with his nature in communities
organized and directed by reason. We can say that the latter is bad
because it denies and over-rides the judgments of rational beings.
These valuations are not whimsical but are based upon fact. The
judgments are objectively right if the fact about man's nature is true.
The methods of science are appropriate for determining whether or
not man is a rational being, and whether or not reality is characterized
by an immutable rational order, or whether, as the Communists claim
67. NORTHROP, THE MEETING OF EAST AND WEST (1946); NORTHROP, THE
LOGIC OF THE SCIENCES AND THE Humiwrrms (1947).
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the relations between natural and social phenomena are constantly
changing with the dialectic of history.," (This is the ultimate root
of the Communist attack upon the Christian religion which represents
the universe as characterized by a God-created immutable order.)
Thus, it will be seen that International Law was from the begin-
ning clearly normative, not only with respect to relations between
States, but also with respect to what kind of community would be
accepted as a subject of International Law and a member of the in-
ternational community. International Law was not a law between
groups of men associated among thlemselves in any way whatever,
but was a law among men who believed themselves rational creatures
and who were organized in communities directed by reason. Inter-
national Law must be normative with respect to the entities of the
international community because International Law is concerned
with distributive justice (as well as commutative justice). The second
book of Grotius' De Jure Belli ac Pacis, which comprises slightly more
than half of the whole work, is concerned with distributive justice.
The first of the three books is concerned with establishing that, be-
cause no international institutions existed to which a State could
appeal for recognition and protection of its rights, a State's use of
war to protect its rights was consonant with the law of a society of
rational beings-natural law. The second book then, quite logically,
is concerned with determining what the rights of States are, or dis-
tributive justice. He deals with original and derivative acquisition of
rights over things and persons. The last book deals with what is
permissible in war, or, in effect, international commutative justice.
In the second book, Grotius was generalizing from the Roman law
conceptions of property ownership. While the rights of States are
not strictly. property rights, they resemble property rights in the
sense of control. International Law in its distributive justice aspect
delimits the areas where the authority of each State will be accepted
by the other States. This distributive function must be normative or it
would be self-contradictory. It would be a negation of law to say that
the authority of any State shall extend to any persons and things to
whom itcan be made to extend by any means whatsoever. This is why
the conception of State in International Law must be normative. The
conception of State is the criterion for a considerable part of interna-
tional distributive justice.
International Law still holds war to be proper for self-protection,
as Grotius held, but we have lately sought to provide international
institutions for the prosecution or protection of national rights as an
equivalent of the domestic law suit. But, if international relations
are not to spill over these institutions into unlimited violence, as in
68. Campbelr, supra note 66, at 281-283.
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Grotius' time they spilled over limited violence into unlimited violence,
it is equally imperative today that there be, among all States capable
of plunging the world into armed conflict, general agreement upon
the rights of States. The basis of agreement underlying traditional
International Law was the conception that men are rational beings
who form working-together groups on the basis of an "agreement
with respect to justice and a partnership for the common good." The
necessary inferences from the fact of the rational nature of man were
the general rules of International Law. The necessary inference
deriving from the fact that such men created society by common
agreement, namely, that promises must be kept, was the basis for
rules of International Law arising out of treaty and pact.
But International Law has changed from a law for the community
of Christian, European nations, their cultural offspring, and nations
willing to conform to the norms of that community. It is in the
process of becoming a law for a community of nations of diverse be-
liefs. That the process is painful and far from complete needs no proof.
We are in a formative period quite similar to that of Grotius' time
when the universal State of Christendom had ruptured. In a very real
sense the inflamed pieces were still a single community as we see today
by noticing the areas where regional pacts are possible. Grotius pre-
scribed the formula for reducing the irritation and restoring life-giv-
ing connections of peaceful intercourse among the newly independent
States.
Three hundred years later a world ordered by these modern Euro-
pean States through cultural influence, colonies, mandates, conces-
sions, industrial advantage, and superior armies and navies, has
become disordered by a growing respect for cultural diversity, the
end of colonies and concessions, and the explosive German and Com-
munist cultural digressions. In our ruptured world when we speak
of international community what do we conceive to be its entities?
If we call them States---as we do, out of convenience-what do we now
mean by State? We can not mean a "community formed and directed
by reason" without contradicting recent events. But there is an as-
sumption of International Law, one step deeper, that remains valid
in a world of diverse beliefs.
When men form a community according to a belief in the rational
nature of man, as described above, there is involved, in the logical
sense, not only the assumption that men are rational creatures, but
also the assumption that men form a community on the basis of a
belief about the nature of man and the universe. This part of the
logical foundation of International Law remains. As a ground norm
of International Law it would mean that a State is not solely a com-
munity of belief in reason, but any community of belief. It strains
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credibility to speak of communities in which men do not believe in
reason, but a review of the discussion of logic and of the origin of
our conception. of rational thought will show that what we mean by
reason is very much a part of our own belief.
The conception of a. State as a community of belief (bearing in
mind that "belief" is used in Ortega's sense of a picture of life and
the universe that has seeped into the consciousness of a people until it
has ceased to be an idea and has become, to them, unquestionable
reality) accords with the widely accepted view that one people's truth
is another people's error and that if International Law is to exist at
all in a world of diverse beliefs it must be impartial as to such beliefs.
This conception of State can accommodate within the international
community, for instance, Islamic countries such as Pakistan whose
constitution is being worked out on the principle, among others, that
Pakistan shall be a State, . --
[w ]herein the Muslimnshall be enabled to order their lives in
the individual and collective spheres in accord with the teachings
and requirements <6f Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and the
Sunna.. ..
All the communities of the Near and Far East that were once ex-
cluded from the international community can be included in it, on
grounds of full equality, under the definition of State as a community
of belief, instead of as a community of rational beings. But a Com-
munist-controlled society is still not a State.
A Communist-controlled society is not a State conceived as a corn-
munity of rational beings because the Communist criterion of truth is
not reason but history, and its logic differs accordingly. But neither
is a Communist-controlled society a community of belief even though
it is formed and directed by a belief. This is so because the Communist
belief, the Communist picture of the universe and life, gives Com-
munists license, nay commissions them, to capture the working peo-
ple of the world and hold them against their will until the material
conditions of the Good Society according to Communist belief have
been created, at which time, supposedly, their eyes will be opened
and they will thank their captors for dragooning them into paradise.
The Communist party and all voluntary adherents to a Communist
society constitute a community of belief. In fact, it would be hard
to find a more clear-cut example of an idea becoming "unquestionable
reality" for a group of men and their building a society in accordance
with it. But the Communist belief requires the believers to bring
under their control non-believers. Thus, Communism is in;mical to
an international community and International Law based on diversity
of belief.
69. From the Objectives Resolution, quoted in Khan, Pakistan's Place in Asia,
6 INT'L J. 266 (1951).
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Communism is not a plan for organizing one or a few out of many
entities in an international community. It is a plan for organizing
the population of the earth, not on the basis of what peoples believe,
but on the basis of what Communists believe.
INFERENCES
Nationality has come territorially unstuck. This is the primary
inference that I believe should be drawn from the foregoing.
In the Christian, European Family of Nations the natural delimita-
tion of national authority was territorial. Modern States had been
recently formed by a combination of feudal and ecclesiastical law.
The ecclesiastical law carried into the modern world the conceptions
of the universality of law and the equality of men of Roman law and
Christian theology. James Bryce has said:
Rome is the only city to which it has been given to rule the whole
of the civilized world, once as a temporal, once as a spiritual
power. In both phases she welded the diverse and incongruous
elements into a united body, whose elements, even when they had
again been disjoined, retained traces of their former origin. And
on both occasions it was largely through law that she worked,
the ecclesiastical law of her later period being an efflux of the
civil law of her earlier.70
But ecclesiastical law, though an "efflux" of earlier Roman law, did
not attempt to cover the whole range of man's activities. The Church
did not work out a system of land law or of status. On the other
hand, feudal law did not develop a theory of justice, equity, or crime.
In some fields, such as family law, succession, contract, corporation,
the two systems of law met "in conflict and in compromise." As
Vinogradoff put it, "Feudal law has too narrow and Canon too wide
a basis: one starts from the estate and the other from mankind'12
Feudal law was personal and local. The Roman tradition was of law
valid for all men in every place. The law of modern States is a syn-
thesis. It asserts a universal validity, but only as to a limited geo-
graphical area. All men within that area are subject to it.
In the adjustment between nations, rules of International Law
were worked out defining the circumstances under which transit or
residence within a State's territory would be permitted without sur-
rendering primary allegiance to the home State, and defining the
extent of subjection to the law of the territorial State. The absolute
nature of a State's authority over its territory was recognized in the
State's right under International Law to refuse entry or to expel.
The convenient territorial delimitation of national authority was
70. BRYcE, ST-DiEs IN HISTORY AND JURISPRLDENCE 592 (Oxford 1901).
71. 1 VINOGRADOFF, op. cit. supra note 33, at 159.
72. Ibid.
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possible among States sharing the same belief, the same picture of
life and the universe. No matter to which State, in such a Family of
Nations, a man found himself owing allegiance, he could make his
living in what would seem to him an honorable way, he would find
himself among persons who held the same things sacred, the same
acts just, noble, or base. National boundaries did not mark limits of
belief, but limits of language, race, past conquest, natural ecological or
geological divisions. Even among the nations having community of be-
lief in the rational nature of man a modification in absolute national
authority was thought necessary when differences among nationals ap-
proached the totalness of a difference in belief. In the seventeenth
century and during the past century we have seen many instances of
treaties containing guarantees in protection of religious or racial
minorities, and providing for plebiscites or giving residents an option
to emigrate.When the difference was the total one of belief, territorial delimita-
tion of national authority never was the rule of International Law.
Extraterritoriality is the proof of that fact.
Belief has always been present in the International Law conception
of State, hlong with the empirical factors of a people, territory, and
a sovereign government in effective control. When the international
community was one of common belief, instead of diverse beliefs, there
was no need to raise the matter of belief in delimiting national au-
thority. Therefore inquiry could be limited to the question of effec-
tive control, in respect to revolution and rebellion, and a proper
treaty of cession or an act of annexation in matters of conquest. It
could be assumed that when these criteria were met the authority of
the national government was legitimate under International Law for
all the'persons found within the territory of that nation. But, I submit
we must conclude from the previous discussion, it has always been the
fact of community of belief among the persons within that territory
that has caused the use of organized violence against persons found
therein to be characterized by International Law as an application of
the internal law of a State rather than brigandage and unlawful war.
Is community of belief still a factor in the International Law con-
ception of State? I have produced historical evidence that community
of belief' (of a particular belief) was a factor in the conception of
State of traditional International Law. I have shown that logically
this element of the basis of International Law remains to us in a
world characterized by diverse beliefs. But viable international com-
munity and effective International Law are impossible without volun-
tary agreement among at least all those States too powerful to be
coerced by the rest of the international community. Community of
belief as the basis of the International Law conception of State would
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1955/iss1/5
COMMUNISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
appear to be acceptable to the peoples outside the stream of Western
civilization who have come into the Family of Nations in recent years
because it gives equal dignity and protection to their own beliefs.
Furthermore, Western ideas of social justice are relied upon by Asians
and Africans who are ending colonialism. Perhaps some consultation
should be undertaken.
Communist cooperation is obtainable on no world program except
organization of all the peoples of the earth according to the Com-
munist belief. Therefore the question is not what basis of interna-
tional community and law Communists will voluntarily accept, but
rather, what course of action will oblige the Communists to give up
world revolution and accept a place in an international community
under law. International Law based on community of belief would be
as just for Communists as for the adherents of any other belief. But
it would accord Communist-controlled societies the rights and privi-
leges of States only to the extent they qualify as States under the
conception of community of belief, and no more.
We have thought it only a "moral" judgment to say that Red China
is not entitled to be recognized as a State under International Law.
In fact, our hardheaded "realists" have been most wrong when they
have bottomed their arguments on what to them was unescapable
fact, namely, that "there is a Red China, we can't ignore that," or
"like it or not Soviet Russia is a fact:' Social facts, yes, but not en-
titled to be accepted and allowed to continue to exist as facts by the
other members of the international community. To change social
facts that do not accord with legal norms is the business of law. That
we should ever have thought it necessary to accept and live with such
social facts as Communist-controlled societies, and that we should
have thought a contrary opinion to be founded only in irrelevant
morality and not in International Law, is a measure of the extent
to which we ourselves have been blinded by the autonomous praxi-
ology that, in fuller application, has produced the Stygian belief of
Communism. We can not accept that belief. We can see the error
by which it arose. On the other hand, our own premise-.-community
of belief as the basis of the State-requires that the persons who do
hold the Communist belief have a right to live by it. If defined ter-
ritorially, "Red China," "Communist Poland," 'or "Soviet Russia,"
are not States but social abattoirs. But to the extent of the Communist
party members, plus voluntary adherents, they are States-States
which presently the other members of the international community
are allowing to commit unhampered aggression upon nearly one-
fourth of mankind.
Nine hundred million persons are presently under the control of
Communist regimes. The Communist party itself claims fewer than
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thirty million members throughott the world." Give them ten volun-
tary adherents to every party member and the remaining five hundred
and seventy million persons is nearly one-fourth the population of
earth. What quicker way to erase the Communist threat to interna-
tional community than to reduce Communist manpower to the point
where they would be obliged to accept the protection of International
Law? In fact, it is principally the protection they are presently de-
riving from International Law interpreted territorially that enables
them to retain their hold on their victims. Misinformation is con-
stantly pumped into them, millions are shot, intimidated, shipped to
slave labor camps, and International Law has held all this legal on
the ground of the immunity of a sovereign State from interference
betiveen a government and its people plus a territorial interpretation
.of State.
In feudal society, land was a median term in any relation between
men:
The lord had rights in his man as well as in his land; the man
had rights in the land as well as in himself. A landless man was
an anomnaly; a holding of land naked of labor, a concept to which
the manorial mind could hardly rise.7 4
Our term for land ownership, "fee," is of the same root as "feud,"
and "fief," and expresses the-fusion of land and allegiance. Allegiance
was not terminable by the person who owed it because it was a part
of property. The property owner could terminate his ownership, but
unless he did so the property-and the allegiance--belonged to himself
and his heirs forever. Necessarily allegiance was conceived as per-
petual
We count feudalism as history.' Should, then, International Law
continue to 'accept a feudal conception of national allegiance? We
say we have moved from status to contract. Relations between men
are rooted not in the soil, but in the rational mind that knows, de-
liberates, and assents. Allegiance is rooted in the less conscious, but
none the less mental, process of belief and adherence. Why is not
allegiance extinguishable by the mind that creates it?
The Manila Pact was hailed as an innovation in that it contemplates
action of the signatories with respect to internal affairs of a nation.
Is it not, rather, recognition of the fact that aggression can no longer
be defined solely in territorial terms but must first be defined in terms
of belief? And that, in turn, is a recognition of the fact that obedience
to command and allegiance to commonpurpose-nationality--an no
longer be defined solely in territorial terms when a difference in belief
73. According to a Moscow survey reported in The New York Times, July 4,
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exists between persons inhabiting the same territory. Territorial
definition of nationality is still valid wherever the people of a territory
share a common belief. It is still valid in territory containing persons
of different beliefs that are tolerant of each other's beliefs, because
no one is prevented from living in accordance with his own belief.
But a territorial definition of nationality is no longer valid in any
territory where Communists control the government because they
conceive the purpose of government to be the pressing of every man,
woman and child into the proletarian womb from whence they shall
(supposedly) one day be born anew in a classless Utopia.
Territorially-defined nationality has come unstuck. When we are
desperately pressed we read that lesson in the logic of events. The
Manila Pact is an instance. Our insistence upon voluntary repatria-
tion as a condition of armistice in Korea is another instance. Faced
with the reality of having to turn men over to a regime that is forcing
upon the Chinese people an order of society that denies everything
they have held good and true, we insisted upon their right to choose.
Having read twice from the logic of experience, need we wait to be
battered further? Can we not at least proclaim that perpetual alle-
giance is incompatible with an International Law based on community
of belief and declare that whenever a change of government entails
a change in belief every person within the territory of that State has
the right of emigration? Oppenheim calls the right of emigration a
"moral right which would fittingly find a place in any international
recognition of the Rights of Man."' 5 If International Law is now
based on community of belief is not the right of emigration a rule of
law, not just of morality?
This, after all, is the one issue that divides the Communist world
from the free world, and that justifies the non-Communist nations'
characterization of themselves as "free," namely, that in free nations
men live by what they believe, in Communist-controlled societies men
live by what the Communists believe. What would happen if the free
nations would undertake to resettle and care for every man, -woman
and child who wants to emigrate from Communist-controlled societies,
and gave them every aid, through underground organizations, to
escape the barbed wire and the armed guards? Money spent to restore
these persons to life in freedom would reduce the Communist power
to threaten peaceful international community and would eventually
permit a reduction in our expenditures for weapons of mass death.
Some of the increased productivity derived from the development of
peaceful uses of atomic power might be channelled into a tremendous
resettlement program.
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Any mass emigration from Communist-controlled societies would
burden the natural resources of the free nations and raise the issue
whether these emigrants were entitled to a share of the natural re-
sources of the nations of which they were once a pait. Of course this
raises problems that in advance appear to be insoluble and that are
distasteful for being strange. But, with the power drawn out of the
Communist threat, the problems we would face would be within our
power to solve. Our hopes for a peaceful international community
under law would not dangle on the end of a Kremlin communique.
I-do not believe that general acceptance of the thesis proposed here
would endanger the United Nations. It would not be creating a dif-
ference or making a rift where none existed. It would simply be rec-
ognizing a basic antagonism that has been present all the time. The
Communists have been fully aware of it. They always distinguish be-
tween "bourgeois States," and "proletarian States"--at least for ana-
lytical purposes, not for strategic and propaganda purposes. It is im-
possible either to reach agreement with or to defend against an
antagonist who is not clearly understood. I would suggest the infer-
ence would not be proper that we should withdraw from the United
Nations.' It is still useful for the extremely important but limited pur-
poses for which it was useful before. Perhaps more persons would
realize that the United Nations is not in all respects an institution,
i.e., a social tool for accomplishing agreed-upon goals. To a consider-
able extent the United Nations is a hope, and a forum, not an institu-
tion.
I trust it is clear that an inference that preventive war is justified
would not be proper. In the first place, Communists themselves have a
right to live by their own belief. In the second place, preventive war
has been discussed in terms of using nuclear weapons against centers
of production and destroying Russia's power to make war, on the
ground that war is inevitable. This, again, is the mistake of treating
Communists and their victims as comprising a State. Force is a
medium of the Communist revolutionary challenge to international
community. Defenders of that community would certainly be justified
in using force also. But the only appropriate force is the selective,
limited violence of revolutionary tactics that will help the victims to
sever the grasp of their Communist masters. Making war in terri-
torial terms would drive the victims, in self-defense, into the Com-
munist embrace.
I do not pretend to know all the inferences that should be drawn
from the thesis I have proposed and adduced evidence to prove. Many
implications will become clear only when specific problems are re-
judged in the light of the priority of belief over territory as the basis
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of national allegiance. I do insist that if an international community
of free, independent nations is to survive the onslaught of Communist
revolution, the free nations must learn to know themselves and the
enemy and must begin to drive by the logic of their convictions, in-
stead of being driven by the logic of experience.
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